As a result of the Risk Analysis recently commissioned by American Mensa, the SIG Advisory Committee published its findings and recommendations in its report dated March '04.
I don't mind sticking my neck out and agreeing with the proposition that the activities of some SIGs (Special Interest Groups) do pose potential liabilities to American Mensa. AML has simply botched the job of providing itself with plausible distancing from the SIGs and their activities; as a result, the SIGs are being looked at with an eye to reducing AML's overall liability risk.
That said, this report looks to me like one of the worst pieces of "awfulizing" I've seen. The "preferred" solution to the problem of potential liability based on SIG activities — which had been introduced long before this report was ever written — was to grant AML more direct control over the SIGs and their activities. The proposal of the committee, as made in this report, is the first step in achieving this preferred solution, since the other possible proposals are buried under claims of unknown, unknowable, potential liability lawsuits.
First, I should remind everyone that this report is the product of an advisory committee. This means that AML is not bound to follow the committee's suggestions, nor even to follow the suggestions in the way the committee intends. It is AML that will make the decisions on how SIGs will be handled (or not).
Let's look at the conflict as presented in the report. AML claims that it is not responsible for actions taken by or on behalf of any SIG. Yet there is an appointed SIGs officer; members are encouraged to join SIGs, which are presented as a membership benefit; and SIGs are officially recognized and must follow certain requirements to gain or retain recognition or event publicity.
The obvious solution would appear to be to dump any and all ties between AML and the SIGs — to make them in truth the "voluntary associations of members," separate from AML-controlled functions, that they have always claimed to be. Yet this very obvious solution is countered by the possibility that AML "could be named in a lawsuit" based on SIG activity.
We live in a litigious society, where bumping into someone on the sidewalk could result in a charge of assault and battery. Yet we take the risk of walking anyway. It's true that plaintiffs' attorneys name everyone they possibly can as defendants in a suit; yet it's also true that courts throw out some of those defendants for lack of responsibility.
The real concern comes in the report's third paragraph, under "Withdraw Services from SIGs": A lawsuit based on SIG activities might cost American Mensa money that it couldn't get back from our insurers — or the cost of insuring Mensa might increase. In fact, however, that concern comes through for each of the alternatives mentioned in this report.
But is that concern a valid reason for AML to want to more closely embrace the SIGs? I say it isn't. If AML wants to reduce its liability, then it shouldn't be increasing its control over the thing that it claims will increase its liability.
I know the report says that increased services would be available to those who wish to take advantage of them — in other words, they're optional. But notice that those lovely optional services include a measure of control over the purse strings (through collecting and forwarding SIG dues) and communication lines (maintaining e-lists, printing and distributing newsletters).
And what would happen to the confidentiality of certain SIGs' membership lists? This would be gone, with the National Office maintaining the list, validating Mensa membership of SIG members, and verifying ages of SIG members.
I hear some say that these increased services are optional. I can only respond by saying that making them optional is this report's recommendation; it's not necessarily what AML will decide to do. If the services were and remained optional, my own concerns would lessen; but there are no guarantees that they will start as, or continue to be, optional.
The proposed solution is also flawed in that it is basically the "Do Nothing" alternative. (The report says, "There is no change to SIG administration policy recommended. The SIGs will continue to operate as currently with the additional services available to the SIG Coordinators.") The "Do Nothing" proposal was marginalized by the triple awfulizations of possible unspecified increased liability for AML, possible unspecified increased insurance costs for AML, and possible unavailability of insurance coverage for AML.
AML's excessive trepidation over potential lawsuits is reflected in the document's repeatedly expressed concern over potential increased liabilities for AML because of the activities of its SIGs — yet it never actually states what kinds of activities are risky nor estimates what the levels of risk for such activities are. The most logical position — complete separation of AML and SIGs — is rejected in favor of a proposal that would combine a "do nothing" policy with increased services that, were some SIGs to take advantage of them, would result in the immediate loss of membership list confidentiality that such SIGs have promised to their members, and the potential for future loss of their autonomy.
I think the minuses far outweigh the pluses, and so I do not support the proposals by this committee. It is, indeed, risky SIG business.